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There is growing evidence from both the lab and the ﬁeld to suggest that consumers do
not process all the parameters relating to the choices they face.1 Tax attributes, for exam-
ple, may not always be salient in consumer decisions and individuals may not optimize
with respect to tax-inclusive prices. A number of papers have considered the difference
between ‘visible’ attributes, which are processed, and ‘shrouded’ ones,2 which are not,
exploring, among other things, how consumers respond to exogenous changes in the
visibility of attributes (Brown et al., 2008; Chetty et al., 2009; Finkelstein, 2009). One as-
pect that has received less empirical attention is the possibility that the non-processing
of attributes may be a deliberate choice. Attention is a scarce resource, and consumers
may rationally choose to forgo processing of attributes – even if they are fully visible – if
processing entails sufﬁciently high costs compared to the beneﬁts of processing and re-
sponding. This ‘rational inattention’ interpretation of the non-processing of attributes is
the focus of this paper.
We look at rational inattention in the context of tax subsidies for private donations,
which are present in the majority of developed countries. Most governments that offer
tax subsidies do so in the form of a tax rebate – either deductions from taxable income or
tax credits granted at the marginal rate of income tax; some countries, such as the UK, also
offer a match-style element, i.e. charities can claim tax relief on donations at an income-
tax equivalent rate. Both rebate and match incentives lower the price of giving and are
designed to encourage giving; but they work in crucially different ways, in particular
with respect to the implications of non-processing. To see this, deﬁne d as the nominal
donation which the donor chooses, g as the match-inclusive contribution to the charity,
and c asthenetcosttothedonor, anddeﬁne m astherateatwhichthenominaldonationis
matchedbythegovernmentand r astherebaterate; i.e. g = (1+m)d; c = (1−r)d. Ifcon-
1DellaVigna (2009) provides an overview and analysis of existing literature.
2Gabaix and Laibson (2006) deﬁne a shrouded attribute as one that is hidden even though it could be
nearly costlessly revealed.
1sumers do not process a change in the match and do not change their nominal donation
in response, then the match-inclusive contribution received by the charity automatically
adjusts. If consumers choose not to process a change in the rebate, on the other hand, and
do not change their nominal donation, there is no effect on the match-inclusive contribu-
tion received by the charity; rather the net cost to the contributor adjusts. If donors value
the activities that are funded with their contributions, as in standard models of giving,3
there are therefore different costs of inattention for the two types of subsidy. We exploit
this asymmetry in non-processing costs – which is peculiar to contribution subsidies – to
assess the extent to which non-processing behavior is consistent with a model of rational
inattention.
Recent experimental evidence has shown that offering donors a match has a bigger
effect on contribution levels than offering a rebate of equivalent value (Eckel and Gross-
man, 2003, 2008; Davis et al., 2005). This ﬁnding is inconsistent with a standard model
of giving in which consumers care about contributions. The difference persists when
donors are given information on the relationship between their nominal donation, the
total contribution to the charity and the net cost, suggesting that the difference cannot
simply be attributed to confusion on the part of donors. Eckel and Grossman attribute
the difference to preferences: following B´ enabou and Tirole, 2006, they argue that the
match induces greater giving because it is associated with a ‘cooperation frame’, while
the rebate is associated with a ‘reward frame’. However, rationalizing such differences
as arising from framing effects relating to differential warm-glow effects is potentially
problematic. Davis et al. (2005) argue instead that, faced with a complex set of incentives,
donors ignore both match and rebate and focus only on the nominal donation. They refer
to this as an ‘isolation’ effect.
The model of rational inattention we present here provides an alternative explanation
forthedifferentialeffectofmatchandrebatesubsidies. Althoughourrationalinattention-
based interpretation of non-processing is superﬁcially related to that of Davis et al. (2005),
3In such models, donors are assumed to care about total contributions to the public good and/or derive
an additional warm glow from their own contribution, for example Roberts, 1987, Andreoni, 1990.
2non-processing of match and rebate changes in our model is the result of a rational ex-
ante choice, which involves an ex-ante assessment of processing costs and beneﬁts that
depends on individual preferences for private consumption and charity provision. Ac-
cordingly, donors may deliberately choose to – or not to – process match and rebate in
different situations, which is what is observed in practice.
We present empirical evidence that is consistent with this interpretation. In particular,
we show that the majority of donors do not adjust their nominal donation (an indicator
for processing the subsidy change) in line with a change in either the match or the rebate,
but also that the probability of adjusting differs between match and rebate as we would
expect on the basis of the different implications for non-processing costs for the two types
of subsidy; and that, consistently with rational inattention, it is higher when the donation
is larger, and is higher for greater price changes.
Our main evidence comes from our own survey of UK taxpayers who were asked
how they would respond to (hypothetical) changes in match and rebate tax subsidies.
The UK case is ideal for exploring donor responses to the two subsidy types, because, as
already highlighted, the main scheme through which private donors get tax relief on their
donations (known as Gift Aid) has both a match and a rebate element. We can therefore
directly explore donor responses to different types of ﬁscal subsidies. Stated choice is
not a common approach in policy evaluation (although for a recent example see Krueger
and Kuziemko, 2011); we discuss our survey methods and related limitations in detail in
Section 3. We also present further analysis of the data from the original lab experiment
carried out by Eckel and Grossman (2003) to conﬁrm that the main ﬁndings from our
survey are not a result of hypothetical bias or survey design.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our model
of rational inattention, drawing out the main predictions for how donors are likely to
respond to changes in match and rebate incentives. Section 3 describes our survey and
discusses the stated choice approach. Section 4 presents the main results from our survey
and section 5 presents additional supporting evidence using data from the original Eckel
and Grossman lab experiment. Section 6 concludes.
32 Rational inattention
Rational inattention embodies the idea that consumers may deliberately choose not to
process some potentially relevant attributes in making their decisions if doing so is costly.
This conjecture is related both to the concept of ‘limited rationality’ characterized by Lip-
man (1991) and to the idea of ‘rational inattention’ that has been invoked in the macroe-
conomics literature on price stickiness (Sims, 2006). In this section we present a simple
formalization of rational inattention in the context of charitable giving.
As in standard, non-cooperative models of giving, we assume that donors care about


















where d(i,t) is i’s nominal donation at time t – the amount the donor writes on the check,
corresponding to the action the donor directly takes – r(t) ∈ R is the rebate rate at time t,
and m(t) ∈ M is the match rate at time t. The net donation (the cost of the donation to
the donor) is c(i,t) = (1−r(t))d(i,t), and the individual’s total contribution – the second
argument in U – is g(i,t) = (1+ m(t))d(i,t) = c(i,t)/p(t), where p(t) = (1− r(t))/(1+
m(t)) is the price of giving.
Suppose that, prior to making choices in period t, the individual has well deﬁned









≡ π(m),m ∈ M. Also assume that there
is no further donation choice to be made after period t or, equivalently, that observing
m(t) and r(t) conveysnoinformationaboutthedistributionofpossiblevalues (m(t),r(t))
at t + 1.4
Following a given realization of match and rebate rates at time t, the individual can
4Our arguments could be extended to a dynamic choice framework where mt and rt do convey infor-
mation about future realizations of match and rebate, and where, therefore, individuals use any current
observation to update their beliefs. To be tractable, such an extension would require making simplifying
assumptions about the form of the mechanism generating m(t) and r(t) – e.g. that m(t) and r(t) follow a
Markov process.
4observe these rates and can process the information by incorporating it into an ex-post
optimal choice. Doing this involves, for each of value of the match and rebate, a non-
monetary cost K(i).5 Alternatively, prior to making choices at t, the individual can decide
not to process the match, the rebate, or both, and save the associated cost; in this case, she
will be unable to condition her choice of d(i,t) on the realization of the tax relief parame-
ters, and she will instead have to choose a single value d(i,t) that is optimal ‘on average’
given her beliefs over possible realizations. To choose to do so rationally, however, the
individual must come to an ex-ante assessment that also incorporates the values of the
possible realizations of the tax relief parameters, which implies that the processing must
take place even in that case, albeit prospectively, and that a processing cost, K0, must be
incurred even then. Nevertheless, if the processing that is performed ex ante does not ex-
onerate the individual from having to process the information again to arrive at an ex-post
optimal choice after observing a certain realization, then forgoing to process information
ex post will involve a lower overall processing cost. This seems plausible if the cost is
thought of as both a pure processing cost and also an adjustment cost.
Let the choice of whether or not to process the match and the rebate be respectively
represented by σm(i,t) ∈ {0,1} and σr(i,t) ∈ {0,1}, where 0 denotes inattention and
1 denotes attention. Omitting t indices, we then have four possibilities, each yielding
different expected payoffs:







Y − d(1− r),d(1+ m)
￿i
− K0 − 2K
≡ Γ(σm = 1,σr = 1) − K0 − 2K, (2)
where E[.] is the expectation operator – incorporating the individual’s subjective
5Sims (2006) characterizes rational inattention in terms of constraints on processing capacity, which
means that the cost of processing a piece of information is an opportunity cost, deﬁned by alternative
uses of such capacity. In our context, the simpler characterization we adopt is sufﬁcient for our purposes.
The processing cost may be thought of as incorporating the cost of both working out the ex-post optimal
amount and adjusting the nominal donation accordingly.
5beliefs.









Y − d(1− r),d(1+ m)
￿￿i
− K0 − K
≡ Γ(σm = 1,σr = 0) − K0 − K, (3)
where the expression within the outer expectation operator is the indirect utility
obtainable by selecting d optimally after processing m but not r.









Y − d(1− r),d(1+ m)
￿￿i
− K0 − K
≡ Γ(σm = 0,σr = 1) − K0 − K, (4)
where the expression within the outer expectation operator is the indirect utility
obtainable by selecting d optimally after processing r but not m.







Y − d(1− r),d(1+ m)
￿i
− K0
≡ Γ(σm = 0,σr = 0) − K0. (5)
Choosing amongst the above four possible conﬁgurations, the individual will then ratio-
nally select the processing strategy (σm,σr) that results in the highest expected payoff.
In order to derive predictions that can be directly related to our survey evidence on















where η(i) < 0 corresponds to the (unobservable) price elasticity of giving under full
attention (i.e. under zero processing costs).
6Suppose the status quo position is with match m0 and rebate r0, implying a price of
giving of p0 = (1 − r0)/(1 + m0). Now suppose that the donor believes that with proba-
bility 2π(i) (π < 1/2) the price of giving changes to p1 and that with probability π(i) this
change occurs as a result of a change in the match from m0 to m1 = (1 + m0)(p0/p1) − 1
(with the rebate remaining unchanged at r0), and with probability π(i) the price change
occurs as a result of a change in the rebate from r0 to r1 = 1 − (1 − r0)(p1/p0) (with the
match remaining unchanged at m0). The probability of both the match and the rebate
changing is thus zero.6
The optimal donation choices for this speciﬁcation under different processing strate-
gies are detailed in Appendix A1, which also derives results concerning the relationship
between parameter choices and optimal processing choices. These can be best summa-
rized and understood by referring to speciﬁc elasticity scenarios. Consider ﬁrst the case
where the price elasticity of giving under full attention, η(i), is −1; then nominal dona-
tions will never adjust to changes in the match, and therefore no ‘mistake’ is made by
not processing the match. In this case, we would expect the match to never be processed
(as it is irrelevant for the determination of the size of the optimal nominal donation), and
the rebate to be more likely to be processed by large donors than by small donors as not
paying attention to the rebate becomes more costly for larger donations.
Suppose that instead the price elasticity of giving under full attention is 0; then nomi-
nal donations never need to adjust to changes in the rebate. In this case, we would expect
the rebate never to be processed, and the match to be more likely to be processed by large
donors than by small donors. For elasticity values between 0 and −1, nominal dona-
tions need to adjust downwards for increases in the match and upwards for increases in
the rebate, and whether the match or the rebate will be more likely to be processed de-
pends upon how close the elasticity is to either extreme. On the other hand, for elasticity
values greater than unity in absolute value, the adjustment is upwards for increases in
both match and rebate, but the required adjustments in nominal donations for equivalent
6Our analysis and conclusions readily extend to the case where individuals attach different probabilities
to changes in the match and rebate.
7changes in the match and rebate is greater for the rebate than it is for the match, implying
that in that case donors should be more likely to process the rebate than the match, and
no donors should choose to process the match and not the rebate.
As the inattention cost is directly proportional to φ (which is also directly proportional
to donation size), an increase in K has the same effect on processing choices as in increase
in 1/φ – i.e., given all other parameter values, processing choices depend on the ratio
ρ = K/φ.
The relationship between parameters and processing choices is detailed more fully in
Figure 1, which depicts regions in (ρ,η) space that each correspond to a different pro-
cessing behavior; these were derived from an explicit computation of optimal processing
choices for different parameter conﬁgurations, for a given value of π, and for p0 = 1
and p1 = 3/4. For the given values of π, p0, p1, these fully identify processing choices
in the constant elasticity case. Figure 1 refers to a scenario with π = 1/6. The region
labeled as N represents parameter conﬁgurations for which neither match nor rebate are
processed – which occurs for low levels of donations (relative to processing costs) and/or
for elasticity values that are close to unity in absolute value. The region labeled as R
represents parameter conﬁgurations for which only the rebate is processed – this occurs
for comparatively larger donations (relative to processing costs), and for elasticity values
that are greater than 1/2 in absolute value. When the elasticity parameter is less than 1/2
in absolute value, then it is possible for only the match to be processed – region M in the
ﬁgure. In the region labeled as B, both match and rebate are processed. Finally, when η is
close to one in absolute value, variations in η have little effect on processing choices, and
speciﬁcally on the choice of whether to process both match and rebate or rebate only (the
boundary between regions B and R becomes vertical in the neighborhood of |η| = 1).
From the model, choices consistent with rational inattention should then exhibit the
following patterns:
(a) The choice to adjust nominal donations following changes in the match or the rebate
should be (weakly) positively correlated with the size of nominal donations;
(b) The choice to adjust nominal donations following changes in the match or the rebate
8should be (weakly) positively correlated with the size of the implied price change;
(c) If contributions are sufﬁciently price-elastic, more individuals will adjust their nom-
inal donations to changes in the rebate than to changes in the match, and individ-
uals who are adjusters when the match changes are also adjusters when the rebate
changes;
(d) Responses will be comparatively more consistent (in terms of implied price elastic-
ities) across match and rebate for adjusters than for non-adjusters.
The rest of the paper explores whether these patterns are observed in practice.
3 Survey evidence: the UK Gift Aid scheme
We use a survey-based approach to explore how UK donors respond to changes in match
and rebate ﬁscal incentives. As already noted, the UK makes for an ideal case study be-
cause the main UK scheme for tax relief on giving, known as Gift Aid, embodies both
subsidy types.7 Gift Aid works in the following way: individuals donate to charity out
of their net-of-tax income; the charity can then reclaim tax relief on donations made by
taxpayers at the basic rate of tax, currently 20 percent, which means that for every £1
donated to charity, the charity can reclaim 25 pence. This can be thought of as a match
on donations made by taxpayers. In addition, higher-rate taxpayers can reclaim a rebate
equal to the difference between the higher rate of tax at 40 percent and the basic rate of tax
at 20 percent on the ‘gross’ equivalent donation, i.e. the amount before basic rate tax was
deducted. This means that for every £1 donated out of net income, a higher-rate taxpayer
can get an additional rebate of 25 pence. Note that in order for higher-rate taxpayers to
receive the additional rebate, they need to make a claim through a self-assessment tax
return (completed by approximately one third of all UK taxpayers) or ask for a change
7Other schemes include a payroll-giving scheme that allows donors to give to charity out of their gross
earnings, gifts of shares and property and charitable bequests. Gift Aid accounts for more than £4 billion in
2009-10 out of estimated total donations of around £10 billion.
9in their tax code via a simpler tax review form. Either way, there is an additional ad-
ministrative cost for donors on the rebate element compared to the match element. In
practice, not all higher-rate taxpayers reclaim the additional rebate (as expected, reclaim-
ing is more common among those donating larger amounts). In principle, non-reclaiming
could account for the differential response to different incentives, but we show below that
there is also a difference among those who reclaim.
Invitations to take part in an on-line survey were e-mailed to 40,000 UK-based donors,
split equally between those with a Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) charity account and
those who had donated on-line through Justgiving (an on-line giving portal) during the
previous six months.8 A total of 3,445 respondents were presented with a number of
hypothetical scenarios involving changes to either the match and/or the rebate element
of Gift Aid and asked to state how their donations would respond. We focus our analysis
on 1,422 responses from higher-rate taxpayers.
Stated choice approaches are not commonly used in policy evaluation (although for a
recent example, see Krueger and Kuziemko, 2011). The existing evidence on differential
responses to match and rebate incentives comes from lab experiments and single-charity
ﬁeld experiments. Eckel and Grossman (2003) conducted a laboratory experiment involv-
ing 181 undergraduate students each given twelve allocation problems varying in the ini-
tial endowment and match and rebate rates. In the experiment, match rates resulted in
gross donations that were 1.2 to 2 times greater than the equivalent-value rebate. The
estimated elasticity of gross donations with respect to the price was −1.14 compared a
rebate elasticity of −.36. Similar results were obtained from a ﬁeld experiment (Eckel
and Grossman, 2008). Based on approximately 7,000 responses to a mail-out on behalf of
Minnesota Public Radio, offering match rates resulted in a higher level of gross donations
8CAF is a charity that, among a range of services for individuals and charities, provides a charity ac-
count to donors to facilitate tax-efﬁcient giving. Justgiving is an on-line giving portal that processes do-
nations from individuals direct to charity and individual sponsorships of charity fundraisers. While this
represents a convenience sample, further analysis shows that the results are robust to re-weighting in line
with population. See Scharf and Smith, 2009, for further discussion.
10than equivalent-value rebates. The estimated elasticity of gross donations was −1.05 in
the case of the match rate and −.11 in the case of the rebate rate.
The experimental design of these earlier studies provides credible internal validity,
but there are potential concerns about the external validity of the results, i.e. generalizing
from single-charity ﬁeld experiments or lab experiments to changes in broad-based tax
relief. One strength of our survey for policy purposes is that it focuses on a sample from
the relevant group, i.e. taxpayers, and asks about their response to the relevant instru-
ment, i.e. tax incentives. However, there may be concerns about hypothetical bias in our
survey-based approach.9 We make the following claims in support of the robustness of
our ﬁndings. First, we made the scenarios more realistic by asking respondents to con-
sider how the alternative tax treatments would affect a speciﬁc donation that they had
previously in the survey said that they were likely to make in the next six months rather
than asking generally how they would respond to a change in tax incentives. Second, we
identify the differential effects of the match and rebate from within-person variation. In
a recent paper, Johansson-Stenman and Sveds¨ ater (2008) show in relation to contingent
valuation studies that this is more robust than cross-person identiﬁcation, arguing that
people strive for consistency in their statements. Finally, the survey responses satisfy a
number of internal consistency checks – for example, we deliberately included the same
treatment twice but in a different order to rule out so-called ‘embedding effects’, the phe-
nomenon whereby the responses depend on the way, and the order, in which questions
are presented (see Diamond and Hausman, 1994). These tests are discussed in Scharf and
Smith, 2009.
The overall design of our study was broadly consistent with the lab experiments men-
9Our study differs from a classic WTP study where, according to Harrison and Rustr¨ om ‘... as a matter
of logic, if you do not have to pay for the good but a higher verbal willingness to pay (WTP) response
increases the chance of its provision, then verbalize away to increase your expected utility!’ In our case, it
is not clear ex ante whether donors would over-state since they are directly informed in the survey about
tax changes and incur no real adjustment costs, or under-state since a no-adjustment response is the easiest
answer to give.
11tioned above; survey respondents were randomly allocated across ﬁve treatments each of
which offered two different levels of match and/or rebate subsidy. The main difference
with previous studies is that the treatments consisted of hypothetical scenarios. The de-
sign and description of the scenarios reﬂected the way Gift Aid is portrayed to donors
– i.e. donors were told that the charity would receive x pence for every £1 given out of
net-of-tax income (referred to as the nominal donation) and the individual could reclaim
x pence for every £1 given out of net-of-tax income. Appendix A2 provides further infor-
mation on how the hypothetical scenarios appeared in the on-line survey. Note that the
speciﬁc terms, ‘match’ and ‘rebate’ were not used in the survey because they are not used
in relation to the Gift Aid scheme in practice.
Two (out of the ﬁve) treatment sets involved changes in either the match or rebate. The
changes were symmetrical in terms of pence change for each £1 donated but not in terms
of price changes.10 For example, in set A, individuals were faced with the following two
scenarios:
A.1 A match of 30 pence and a rebate of 25 pence (price of giving = .577);
A.2 A match of 25 pence and a rebate of 30 pence (price of giving = .560);
while in set B, individuals were faced with the following two scenarios:
B.1 A match of 20 pence and a rebate of 25 pence (price of giving = .625);
B.2 A match of 25 pence and a rebate of 20 pence (price of giving = .640).
4 Responses to match and rebate: survey evidence
Using data from our survey, we estimate contribution elasticities with respect to changes
in the match and rebate. Although we are mainly concerned here with the choice of
whether or not to process a match or rebate change – rather than with the magnitude of
10This is in contrast to Eckel and Grossman (2003, 2008) who deﬁned match and rebate pairs that were
equivalent in value but were not symmetrical in terms of rates.
12responses if processing occurs – elasticity measures provide a useful measure for assess-
ing our survey evidence against comparable evidence from earlier experimental studies.
We focus on responses from higher-rate taxpayers and on the set of four scenarios A.1,
A.2, B.1 and B.2. We run regressions of the following form:
ln gin = α + βr ln(1− rs) + βm(1+ ms) + vin, (7)
where gin is the n-th contribution of individual donor i. For each donor, we have up to
three donation amounts – their initial donation, gi0, and donations under the two alter-
native scenarios in their treatment. βm and βr capture the measured elasticity of contri-
butions with respect to the match and rebate, respectively, where variation in the match
and rebate comes from the different scenarios described above. vin = γi + uin includes a
ﬁxed, individual-speciﬁc term, γi, which captures the effects of observed and unobserved
donor characteristics on donations, as well as a zero-mean, IID error term.11 We estimate
this equation using a random-effects model.12
Our basic regression results are reported in Table 1, panel (a). As before, we ﬁnd that
contributions are more elastic with respect to changes in the match than to changes in
the rebate. The magnitudes of the estimated elasticities, −1.13 in the case of the match
and −0.21 in the case of the rebate, are very similar to those from Eckel and Grossman’s
experimental studies, ranging from −1.14 to −1.05 for the match and from −.36 to −.11
for the rebate.
Table 1 reports the proportions of respondents who say that they would change their
nominal donation in response to a change in the match/rebate. These proportions are
fairly low – only 8 percent for the match and 18 percent for the rebate; this low level
11This speciﬁcation formally corresponds to a model where choices are made under full attention, albeit
differently for match and rebate. Accordingly, if observed choices involve rational inattention, the elasticity
estimates thus obtained do not measure the true elasticity, η(i). They are, however, directly comparable
with estimates from the Eckel and Grossman study – which is the main objective of our estimation exercise.
12This yields efﬁcient and unbiased estimates if the rebate and match terms are unrelated to individuals’
characteristics. Since the rebate and match terms are randomly allocated to individuals this should be true
by assumption. Estimating a ﬁxed-effects model yields very similar results.
13of adjustment can (mechanically) explain much of the difference in elasticities between
match and rebate because of the different implications of non-response for contributions
inthecase ofthe twotypesofincentive. Panel(b)reportselasticity estimatesfor thegroup
who do adjust their nominal donations. Consistently with a model of rational inattention
(point (d), end of Section 2), these are much more similar across match and rebate – and
indeed we can no longer reject that they are statistically signiﬁcantly different at the 5
percent level.
High levels of non-adjustment are consistent with our model of rational inattention in
the presence of high processing costs (types in region N of Figure 1), but could also be
explained by an isolation effect (i.e. donors simply ignore changes to taxes and focus on
the nominal donation). However, the fact that donors are more likely to adjust when the
rebate changes than when the match changes is harder to reconcile with a simple isolation
effect, or indeed with an explanation that donors are responding to the cooperation frame
in the match. Also consistent with the predictions of a model of rational inattention (point
(a), end of the Section 2), it is the case that donors making larger donations are more likely
to adjust. This is shown clearly in Figure 2.13
Table 2 gives a breakdown of adjustment numbers by type of subsidy change. More
individuals respond to changes in the rebate than to changes in the match, and most of
13An analogous ﬁnding is reported by Scholnick et al. (2008) with reference to credit card repayments.
Note that this interpretation requires that the processing cost must not be perfectly (positively) correlated
with the size of the donation. While in our quasi-linear speciﬁcation processing costs, K, are exogenous and
speciﬁed independently of φ, one could imagine that they could be endogenously related to donation size
in a more general speciﬁcation. Suppose for example that processing only requires time, and that individ-
uals have identical preferences but differ with the respect to the market value of their time (i.e. their wage);
then, if giving is a normal good, higher-productivity individuals would donate more and would also face
higher processing costs – implying that we should expect a strong positive correlation between donation
size and processing costs and thus signiﬁcant clustering around speciﬁc processing choices, independently
of donation size. Even in such a scenario, however, a positive correlation between donation size and pro-
cessing choices could arise if some of the processing costs are not related to time inputs, or if income is not
perfectly correlated to the market value of time (e.g. in the case of individuals who are retired).
14those who respond to a change in the match also respond to a change in the rebate. As
noted at the end of the previous section (point (c)), these patterns are consistent with a
scenario where the ‘true’ elasticity is greater than unity in absolute value for most donors,
and where some donors are of types that lie in region R of Figure 1 – corresponding to
comparatively lower elasticity values – and others are of types lying in region B – corre-
sponding to comparatively higher elasticity values and thus exhibiting larger responses.
These patterns also go against a scenario where the ‘true’ elasticity is close to zero – as
the proportion of donors only adjusting to changes in the match and not to changes in
the rebate is very small. Consistently with this intepretation, the measured elasticities for
adjusters (panel (b) of Table 1) are in excess of unity.
Wecanrejectthatthedifferencesinresponsesbetweenmatchandrebateareattributable
to any higher administrative costs associated with reclaiming the rebate. Table 1, panel (c)
looks only at those who are already reclaiming the rebate. The estimated elasticities (and
the proportions adjusting) are higher than when the non-reclaimers are also included, but
there are still signiﬁcant differences in responses across the two types of incentive.
Wealsoexploreanotherpossibleexplanationforthedifferentialresponses, thatpeople
don’t really understand the two types of incentives – and/or understand them differently.
Panel (d) analyzes the responses for a group of donors who are likely to have a fairly good
level of understanding. This is assessed on the basis of individuals’ response to a question
about how much the match is worth to charities. Respondents are told that the charity
can reclaim basic-rate tax and asked to say how much the charity gets for each £1 donated
out of net-of-tax income (choosing one out of a set of possible responses). If they respond
correctly, we deﬁne them as having a good level of understanding. The results show that
the match elasticity is higher and the proportion responding to a change in the rebate is
higher among those with a good level of understanding.
155 Responses to match and rebate: experimental evidence
The survey evidence in the previous section is consistent with our model of rational inat-
tention. We have shown that a large proportion of respondents do not appear to process
subsidy changes, but also that a higher proportion adjust in response to a rebate change
than to a match change, and that respondents are more likely to report adjustment when
they give more. There is a potential concern that these ﬁndings may be affected by hypo-
thetical bias because of the stated choice approach. There is also a concern that comparing
responses to match and rebate changes that are symmetrical in terms of their rate value
may be inappropriate as these produce asymmetrical price changes. To address these
concerns, in this section we provide some additional support for our model’s prediction
using the original data from Eckel and Grossman’s lab experiment.
Eckel and Grossman had 168 subjects each of whom faced twelve different allocation
problems with varying match incentives (25 percent, 33 percent and 100 percent), rebate
incentives (20 percent, 25 percent and 50 percent) and endowment sizes (40, 60, 75 and
100). In practice, we ignore the 100 endowment treatment since there was no variation in
match and rebate rates associated with this option. We also focus on sequential treatment
pairs where there is a change in either the match or rebate rate, as opposed to a change
from a match to a rebate (or vice versa) or only a change in the endowment. Our analysis
therefore concentrates on 920 observations.
In the context of Eckel and Grossman’s experiment, we deﬁne non-adjusters as indi-
viduals adopting the same pass through rate (i.e. the same amount donated as a percent-
age of endowment) from one treatment to the next when either the match or the rebate
has changed. We ﬁnd that the proportion of adjusters is higher in the lab experiment than
in our survey: 77 percent of individuals adjust the proportion of their endowment that
they donate from one treatment to the next in response to a change in the match or rebate.
In general, however, the patterns of adjustment are consistent with our model of rational
inattention.
To explore this we ran a number of simple (random effects) regressions of a binary
indicator for whether the donor adjusts their pass through rate as a function of various
16aspects of the treatment. The main results are summarized in Table 3. The ﬁrst ﬁnding is
that, in line with our survey evidence, donors are more likely to adjust the pass through
rate in response to a change in the rebate than to a change in the match. This is shown in
columns (1)-(3). Secondly, we ﬁnd that donors are more likely to adjust the pass through
rate when the size of the endowment is greater, shown in columns (2)-(4). Finally, we ﬁnd
that the probability of adjustment depends positively on the absolute magnitude of the
price change in the case of a rebate change. There is more variation in match and rebate
rates in the lab experiment than in our survey, and we exploit this to look at the extent
to which adjustment depends on the (absolute) magnitude of the price change. On its
own, the size of the price change has no signiﬁcant effect on the probability of adjustment
(column (3)), but when we interact this with a binary indicator of change in the rebate, the
sizeofthepricechangeispositiveandsigniﬁcant. Inotherwords, aspredictedbyamodel
of rational inattention (under point (b), end of Section 2), the probability of adjustment is
increasing in the size of the price change only if this stems from a change in the rebate.
176 Summary and conclusion
This paper has presented a model of rational inattention that can explain an existing puz-
zle in the charitable giving literature – the ﬁnding that match incentives have a greater
effect on charitable contributions than equivalent value rebate incentives. We have pro-
videdsupportingevidencebothfromasurveyofUKtaxpayersandfromthelab, showing
that donors are more likely to process rebate changes than match changes, and are more
likely to respond when they give more and to greater changes in price. This adds to the
growing empirical literature showing that consumers may not process all the attributes
that are potentially relevant in making consumption decisions. Evidence on processing
choices with respect to a single type of instrument, as used in other studies of tax salience,
cannot uncover the speciﬁc patterns predicted by a model of rational inattention. By com-
paring responses to different but price-equivalent instruments, we ﬁnd support for the
conclusion that, at least in the case of subsidies to private donations, non-processing of
tax attributes can be accounted for by rational inattention.
Our ﬁndings have implications for policy design. Our survey results provide fur-
ther evidence that match-style incentives are more effective than rebate-style incentives
at increasing total contributions received by charities. In relation to tax subsidies for in-
dividual donations, rational inattention has implications for the effectiveness of different
types of tax incentive. More generally, our ﬁndings suggest that policy-makers may think
about affecting outcomes by manipulating processing costs as well as through standard
price incentives. There is a current debate about the use of default options such as auto-
enrolment. In this case the choice of match-style incentives may be seen as an appropriate
default option if giving is reasonably price sensitive but there are costs that mean that
consumers do not process all subsidy changes.
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Appendix A1 Rational inattention in giving
Case I – Full attention (σm = 1;σr = 1) Under full attention, the optimal nominal donation in
each realization is identiﬁed by (omitting the i identiﬁer)
df(m,r) = φpη/(1+ m), (8)
where p = (1− r)/(1+ m). The payoff in each realization is





with vf(m1,r0) = vf(m0,r1). The expected payoff under full attention, gross of processing costs,
is then
Γ(σm = 1,σr = 1) = (1− 2π)vf(m0,r0) + 2π vf(m1,r0) ≡ ΥB. (10)
Case II – Attention to the rebate only (σm = 0;σr = 1) If the individual chooses to process the
rebate but not the match, then donation choices must be separately derived for each of the two
possible realizations the rebate, (i) r = r1, and (ii) r = r0 – which are fully observed and processed
– on the basis of the expected payoff associated with a given choice under each possible rebate
realization.
20(i) If r1 is observed and processed, then the nominal donation will be the same as that under
full attention when the price of giving is p1. This is because, conditional on the change in
the rebate having occurred, the match is m0 with probability one14, i.e.
dr(r1) = df(m0,r1). (11)
In this case, which occurs with probability π, the donor’s payoff will be
vr(r1) = vf(m0,r1). (12)
(ii) If r0 is observed, then m1 will occur with probability ξ = π/(1 − π)15, and so the ex-ante
optimal interior choice of nominal donation is characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition
φ−1/ηd1/η 
ξ(1+ m1)(1+η)/η + (1− ξ)(1+ m0)(1+η)/η￿
= 1− r0. (13)
Substituting m1 = (1+ m0)(p0/p1) − 1 into the above, we can rewrite expression (13) as
φ−1/ηd1/η(1+ m0)(1+η)/η
￿
1− ξ + ξ(p0/p1)(1+η)/η
￿
= 1− r0. (14)






1− ξ + ξ(p1/p0)−(1+η)/η
￿η
. (15)
Note that for η = −1 this coincides with the choice under full attention to the match, i.e.,
dr(r0) = df(r0,m0) = df(r0,m1), and so no “mistake” is made by not processing the match.
This choice results in an expected payoff of





1− ξ + ξ(p0/p1)(1+η)/η
￿
, (16)
which occurs with probability 1− π.
Combining the results obtained under (i) and (ii) above, the overall level of expected utility under
full attention to the rebate only, gross of processing costs, is
Γ(σm = 0,σr = 1) = πvr(r1) + (1− π)vr(r0) ≡ ΥR. (17)
Case III – Attention to the match only (σm = 1;σr = 0) If the individual chooses to process the
match but not the rebate, then donation choices must be separately derived for each of the two
possible realizations of the match, (i) m = m1, and (ii) m = m0 – which are fully observed and
processed – on the basis of the expected payoff associated with a given choice under each possible
match realization.
14The probability of m0 occurring conditional on the realization r1 is Pr{m0|r1} = Pr{m0 ∩r1}/Pr{r1} =
(1− π)/(1− π) = 1.
15Pr{m1|r0} = Pr{m1 ∩ r0}/Pr{r0} = π/(1− π).
21(i) The result is the same as that in Case II(i) above. That is, if m1 is observed and processed
then the nominal donation will be the same as that under full attention when the price of
giving is p1. This is because, conditional on the change in the match having occurred, the
rebate is r0 with probability one16, i.e.
dm(m1) = df(m1,r0) = df(m0,r1). (18)
In this case, which occurs with probability π, the donor’s payoff will be
vm(m1) = vf(m0,r1). (19)
(ii) If m0 is observed, then r1 will occur with probability ξ = π/(1 − π)17, and so the ex-ante
optimal interior choice of nominal donation is characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition
φ−1/ηd1/η(1+ m0)(1+η)/η = ξ(1− r1) + (1− ξ)(1− r0). (20)
Substituting r1 = 1 − (1 − r0)(p1/p0) into the above and solving for the ex-ante optimal





1− ξ + ξ(p1/p0)
￿η. (21)
Note that with η = 0 this coincides with the choice under full attention to the rebate, i.e.,
dm(m0) = df(r0,m0) = df(r1,m0), and so no “mistake” is made by not processing the rebate.
This choice results in an expected payoff
vm(m0) ≡ 1− dm(m0)(1− r0)
 





Combining the results obtained under (i) and (ii) above, the overall level of expected utility under
full attention to the match only, gross of processing costs, is
Γ(σm = 1,σr = 0) = πvm(m1) + (1− π)vm(m0) ≡ ΥM. (23)
Case IV – No attention (σm = 0;σr = 0) Proceeding as for the other cases, if the individual for-
goes to process both the match and the rebate, then her ex-ante optimal interior choice of nominal
donation is characterized by the ﬁrst order condition
φ−1/ηd1/η 
π(1+ m1)(1+η)/η + (1− π)(1+ m0)(1+η)/η￿
= π(1− r1) + (1− π)(1− r0). (24)
16Pr{r0|m1} = Pr{r0 ∩ m1}/Pr{m1} = (1− π)/(1− π) = 1.
17Pr{r1|m0} = Pr{r1 ∩ m0}/Pr{m0} = π/(1− π).
22Substituting r1 = 1 − (1 − r0)(p1/p0) and m1 = (1 + m0)(p0/p1) − 1 into the above and solving





1− π + π(p1/p0)
1− π + π(p1/p0)−(1+η)/η
#η
. (25)
This choice results in an expected payoff, gross of processing cost, equal to
vn ≡ 1− dn(1− r0)
 







1− π + π(p0/p1)(1+η)/η
￿
= Γ(σm = 0,σr = 0) ≡ ΥN. (26)
Processing choices
Consider next a distribution of processing cost types, K, having support K = [K,K]; a distribution
of φ types, havingsupport P = [φ,φ]; andadistributionofelasticity types, η, havingsupport N =
[η,η]; and assume that individual characteristics K(i), φ(i), η(i), are independently distributed
across individuals.
Focus ﬁrst on the choice between processing neither match nor rebate and processing the
match. The cost type ˜ KN,M(φ,η) ∈ K, for given levels η and φ, who will be indifferent between
processing neither match nor rebate and processing the match will be identiﬁed by the condition
ΥN = ΥM − ˜ KN,M, which can be rewritten as
˜ KN,M = ΥM − ΥN. (27)
As the difference ΥM − ΥN is linear in φ, the difference between the left- and right-hand sides of
(27) is linearly homogenous in (K,φ), which means that (27) can only uniquely identify a value
˜ ρN,M corresponding to all of those combinations (K,φ) for which K/φ = ˜ ρN,M. Thus, dividing
both sides of (27) by φ, and letting Ψj = Υj/φ, j ∈ {N, M,R,B}, we can rewrite (27) as
˜ ρN,M = ΨM − ΨN. (28)
Then, an individual of cost type K(i) and valuation type φ(i) will choose to process the match
if K(i)/φ(i) ≤ ˜ ρM, and will choose not to process the match otherwise. As φ is directly related
to the size of the donation, this implies that, for a given level of attention cost, the proportion
of individuals choosing to process the match will be comparatively greater for donor types that
make comparatively larger donations. Proceeding in the same way, we can derive values








that respectively identify individual types that are indifferent between processing neither match
nor rebate and processing the rebate, and individual types that are indifferent between processing
23neither match nor rebate and processing both. And as for the match, we can conclude that, for a
given level of attention cost, the proportion of individuals choosing to process the rebate or both
match and rebate will be comparatively greater for donor types making larger donations.
Let us next focus on the choice between processing only the match and processing both match
and rebate. The corresponding critical ratio ρ = K/φ for indifference between the two is
˜ ρM,B = ΨB − ΨM. (31)
For η = 0, we have ΨB = ΨM (as no mistake is made by not processing the rebate), and therefore
˜ ρM,B = 0; for η < 0, not processing the rebate involves a mistake, and so ˜ ρM,B > 0. With respect to
the choice between processing only the rebate and processing both match and rebate, we have
˜ ρR,B = ΨB − ΨR. (32)
For η = −1, we have ΨB = ΨR (as no mistake is made by not processing the match), and therefore
˜ ρR,B = 0. Then, for η = −1 (and in a neighbourhood of −1),
˜ ρR,B < ˜ ρM,B, (33)
and
ΨR > ΨM; (34)
i.e. there will exist individual types for which ˜ ρR,B < K/φ and for which processing only the
rebate will be preferable to processing both match and rebate as well as to processing only the
match. Noting that ˜ ρN,R = ΨR − ΨN = ΨB − ΨN − ˜ ρR,B, and since ˜ ρR,B = 0 for η = −1, we can
also conclude that, for η = −1 (and in a neighbourhood of −1),
˜ ρR,B < ˜ ρN,R, (35)
and so
ΨR > ΨN; (36)
i.e. there will exist individual types for which ˜ ρR,B < K/φ < ˜ ρN,R and for which processing only
the rebate will be preferable to processing both match and rebate as well as to processing neither.
Together, (33)-(36) imply that, for |η| close to unity, there will be individual types for which
K/φ < ˜ ρR,B and for which it will be optimal to process both match and rebate; individual types
for which K/φ > ˜ ρR,B and for which it will be optimal to process only the rebate; and there will
be no individual types for which it will be optimal to process only the match.
24Appendix A2 How the scenarios were presented
Initial donation
“How likely are you to make any Gift Aid donations to a charity within the next six months? This




• Not very likely
• Not at all likely
• Don’t know
“IF ‘Certain’ or ‘Very likely’ or ‘Fairly likely’: How much do you think that you are likely to give
(to the nearest pound)? If the donation you are thinking about is a regular direct debit or standing
order, please give the total of that donation for a six month period.”
• (write in)
Scenarios
“The Gift Aid scheme allows charities to reclaim the basic rate income tax on your donation and
allows higher rate taxpayers to claim back higher rate tax relief. You are now going to be presented
with two hypothetical changes to the Gift Aid scheme either to the amount that the charity can
reclaim and/or to the amount that higher rate taxpayers can claim back. In each case you will be
asked to consider whether the amount of money that you are likely to give to charity would be
affected by the proposed changes.
Example:
“Through the Gift Aid scheme, the charity you are donating to reclaims the basic rate income
tax on your donation. This is worth 25 pence for every £1 you donate. Suppose instead that the
charity received 30 pence for every £1 you donate. (Assume that the amount of higher rate relief
that you can claim back is unchanged.) Thinking about your donation of [£X] would this change
affect the amount you are likely to give?”
• Yes - I would give more than [£X]
• Yes - I would give less than [£X]
• No - I would give the same amount
25• Don’t know
“IF ‘yes’, how much would you be likely to give (to the nearest pound)?”
• (write in)
• Don’t know
“IF ‘don’t know’, which of these comes closest to what you think you might increase/reduce your
donation by?”
• By 10% or less?
• By more than 10%?
• Don’t know





















Figure 1: Predicted processing behavior by different donor types
p0 = 1, p1 = 3/4,π = 1/6
27Table 1: Responses for sub-groups – survey data 
 Dependent variable = ln contributions 







adjusting  p-value 
(a) All donors  −1.127  (.067)  .083  −.212  (.041)  .183  .0000 
(b) Adjusters  −1.929 (.297)  .397  −1.431 (.179)  .885  .0581 
(c) Reclaimers  −1.277  (.096)  .117  −.415  (.091)  .248  .0000 
(d) Good level of 
     understanding 
−1.368  (.116)  .142  −.440  (.070)  .258  .0000 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses, p-value is for the test that the match and rebate elasticity are equal  
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Note: Shows a smoothed, non-parametric estimator of the relationship between donation size
and probability of adjusting.
Figure 2: Proportion of donors changing nominal donations
29Table 2: Conditional probability of adjusting nominal donations
Proportion who adjust donations when the rebate changes
3 
 
Proportion of adjusters 







                  All        
…don’t adjust to the match  .154  .202  .107 
…adjust to the match  .679  .697  .657 
           Reclaimers       
…don’t adjust to the match  .201  .305  .108 
…adjust to the match  .750  .875  .563 
 
Proportion who adjust donations when the match changes
3 
 
Proportion of adjusters 







                  All        
…don’t adjust to the rebate  .039  .047  .032 
…adjust to the rebate  .319  .307  .341 
           Reclaimers       
…don’t adjust to the rebate  .043  .032  .050 
…adjust to the rebate  .349  .344  .360 
30Table 3: Probability of adjusting to changes in match and rebate – experimental data 
Dependent variable = 1 if donor adjusts pass through rate, = 0 otherwise 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 





















Abs. price change – rebate only (%)         .1031** 
(0.0480) 
 
Change in rebate = 1 if the rebate changes ( = 0 if the match changes)  
Endowment = total amount that people have to allocate (45, 60, 75) 
Absolute price change = absolute percentage change in price 
Abs. price change – rebate only = absolute change in price if brought about by a change in the rebate 
 
31